Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, jens.johansson@filosofi.uu.se
2. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, olle.risberg@filosofi.uu.se
Abstract
Abstract
The counterfactual comparative account of harm (cca) faces well-known problems concerning preemption and omission. In a recent article in this journal, Daniel Immerman proposes a novel variant of cca, which he calls the worse than nothing account (wtna). According to Immerman, wtna nicely handles the preemption and omission problems. We seek to show, however, that wtna is not an acceptable account of harm. In particular, while wtna deals better than cca with some cases that involve preemption and omission, it has implausible implications in other similar cases – cases that, moreover, pose no problems for cca.
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