«The Matter Present in Sensibles but not qua Sensibles». Aristotle’s Account of Intelligible Matter as the Matter of Mathematical Objects

Abstract

Abstract Aristotle explicitly speaks of intelligible matter in three passages only, all from the Metaphysics, in the context of the analysis of definition as the formula that expresses the essence: Metaph. Z10, 1036 a8-11; Metaph.Z11, 1037 a5; Metaph.H6, 1045 a34-36 and 45 b1. In the case of the occurrences of Z10 and Z11, there is almost unanimous consensus that Aristotle uses the expression in a technical way, to indicate the matter of that particular type of objects that are intelligible compounds, of which mathematical objects are paradigmatic instances. By contrast, there is no agreement on how to understand the expression in the case of H6. Here, ‘intelligible matter’ would denote, as stated by some interpreters, the generic element of the definition. The aim of this paper is to show that ὕλη νοητή has the same technical meaning in all the three explicit occurrences in the Metaphisics. Contrary to the interpretation that there is a shift in meaning from Z10-11 to H6, my goal is to illustrate that in both contexts, Aristotle uses the expression ‘intelligible matter’ to designate the matter of mathematical objects insofar as they are paradigmatic intelligible compounds.