Lebanon’s ‘Concomitant Crises’ and Consociationalism as a Leading Form of Conflict Management

Abstract

Abstract Consociationalism is often perceived as a go-to response to ethnicized conflict, a form of ‘political prescription’ proffered by both external mediators and domestic constitutional designers alike. Power-sharing theory posits that extended periods of cross-community cooperation can lessen divisions, allowing the system to give way to more ‘normal’ politics. However, increasing evidence from Lebanon and elsewhere tracks a different set of incentives. Rather than facilitating a virtuous cycle of cooperation and consensus, a more vicious cycle of immobilism, intransigence, and institutional collapse emerges. In Lebanon, this has coincided with a set of intersecting political, economic, and humanitarian crises. This paper outlines how consociationalism’s causal logic has undergone a full reversal in Lebanon, maps the manifestations and implications for the country, and reflects on what power-sharing theory can learn from Lebanon’s consociational experience.