Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico, USA, mwalker@nmsu.edu
Abstract
Abstract
I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4:
1.
It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not.
2.
If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.
3.
It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.
4.
At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.
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