EU Mediation in Egypt: The Limits of Reactive Conflict Management

Abstract

AbstractThis article reviewsEU’s mediation attempts in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. After presenting the main challenges and opportunities ofEUmediation in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) neighborhood,EUinterventions in Egypt are discussed in relation to the 25 January 2011 revolution, during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi, and after the 3 July 2013 coup d’état, focusing specifically on the choice of mediation styles and their timing. It is argued that three contextual conditions that are typical of the crises that erupt during failed democratic transitions – their fast pace, their eminently domestic nature and significant power asymmetries between the main parties involved – exacerbate the structural problems that theEUfaces when intervening in countries that are not current or potential candidates for accession. The analysis ofEUmediation styles during Egypt’s transition provides a critical perspective onEU’s foreign policy making after the Treaty of Lisbon.