Reputation, Pressure and Concession-making in Claim Disputes

Abstract

Abstract This article examines the forces that encourage targets and challengers involved in claim disputes to offer concessions first. Our framework focuses upon reputation and pressure as key forces that can influence concession-making by claim dispute targets and challengers. We argue that past concession behavior both inside and outside of a claim dyad influences the willingness to make concessions, but does so in distinct ways. We also argue that pressure arising from internal conflict within the disputants and from major power involvement in managing the dispute, also influences the occurrence of concession-making. The results of our hazard analysis show that states involved in claim disputes do consider their opponent’s previous concession-making behavior. Our findings point clearly to the history of concessions within the dyad as a key influence on subsequent concession-making and that major power involvement increases the likelihood of concession-making by both challengers and targets.