Reason and the Rhetoric of Legal Obligation in Plato’s Crito

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines Crito’s motives for wanting to help Socrates escape, and Socrates’ rhetorical strategy for handling Crito’s concerns, particularly Crito’s fear of the many. It concludes that Socrates’ admitted concern for his reputation provides the only adequate explanation for his obedience to the court, an explanation which does not rely on his explicit arguments for obligation, but which helps explain why he is concerned to come to the law’s defence. Joining others in suggesting that Socrates’ case for obligation be taken as rhetoric, the examination of the text reveals that not only are Socrates’ arguments too problematic to be an adequate defence of obligation, but these same arguments point to a criticism of punitive law that makes it unlikely that Socrates is philosophically invested in the defence he offers to Crito.