Suspended Sentences in Spain: An Alternative to Prison or a “Bargaining Chip” in Plea Negotiations?

Abstract

Abstract Criminal proceedings in many European states are increasingly being resolved via plea bargaining agreements; yet, there is relatively scant European research on the implications for the defendant or the role this practice plays within the criminal justice system. Using a sample of 1417 criminal cases, this paper examines how suspended prison sentences may be utilized in Spain to encourage or coerce defendants into a guilty plea. In addition to more traditional regression analysis, covariates are controlled through an entropy balancing process. The findings show defendants who agree a plea deal are indeed less likely to enter prison, which has profound implications for criminal justice in Spain and beyond. On the one hand, it appears plea bargaining is being used to improve the efficiency of the system and, thus, maintain its very existence. On the other hand, issues regarding false confessions and sentencing disparities are specifically highlighted.