Contradictory Change

Abstract

Graham Priest has argued that changes occur at a moment of change in which objects are in a contradictory state, being in both the state changed from and the state changed to. In “Moments of Change,” the current author rejected this model on the grounds that every change would require an infinite number of other changes, and that for similar regress problems, the model is not compatible with the Leibniz Continuity Condition that Priest appeals to in the model’s support. In “Contradiction and the Instant of Change Revisited,” Priest rightly points out in response that any regress can be stopped by allowing that some changes can occur without a moment of change and that there are some exceptions to the lcc in the case of change. It is argued here that while the regress can be stopped by allowing for exceptions to the rules, the more exceptions that must be allowed and the more similar the excepted cases are to cases of supposed contradiction, the less attractive both the contradictory account of change and the lcc should be. Secondly, it is argued that the intuitions that make the contradictory account of change seem appealing are likely to disappear if we adopt an eternalist model of spacetime, which we should do in any case in order to best accommodate the special theory of relativity. In particular, eternalism undermines our intuitions that there must be a moment of change in order for change to occur, that contradictory moments are required to allow for a Laplacian universe, that motion must be intrinsic to an object at a time, and that change obeys the lcc.