Investment Arbitration and the Chimera of an Ideal Adjudicative Community

Abstract

Abstract Investment arbitrators – the men and women who adjudicate investor-State disputes – have become an object of study in their own right. Some stakeholders believe that investment arbitration’s institutional design creates perverse economic incentives, leading arbitrators to adopt strategic behaviours and biasing their decision-making processes. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law is currently considering different models for reshaping the way adjudicators are selected and appointed. The rationale behind this reform seems to be to recruit a brand-new troupe, replete with new faces. But, more worryingly, there seems to be an obsession with the professional profile of adjudicators: prior experience in the field is increasingly perceived as a handicap, and repeat players are to be avoided like the plague. This article examines the evolution of the college of investment arbitrators and enquires about its potential future as a professional community.