Abstract
The importance of structural corporate governance factors identified by the New York Stock Exchange’s 2010 Commission on Corporate Governance was reaffirmed here with various empirical and forensic studies. The key, recurring structural factors were all-powerful CEO (the duality factor and related Board independence issues), weak system of management control, focus on short term performance goals (and related executive compensation packages), weak code of ethics, and opaque disclosures. Such weak corporate governance factors were key contributors to both fraudulent financial reporting and excessive risk-taking which facilitated the U.S. financial crisis in 2008. Corporate governance listing requirements by major stock exchanges around the world will help mitigate such problems from recurring in the future.
Subject
Strategy and Management,Public Administration,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Business and International Management
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