Abstract
Recent corporate scandals have led investors to monitor corporate governance more closely. Corporate governance ratings by independent agencies have become popular with investors seeking indicators of good market returns. We present empirical data showing that such CG ratings show no significant correlation with European firms’ stock price appreciation. We conclude with a few thoughts concerning possible dangers associated with the use of CG ratings
Subject
General Business, Management and Accounting
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