Abstract
Corporate governance is widely acknowledged as a key factor of market’s efficiency and corporate performance. Greek company law, under the influence of the financial crisis, has responded actively by incorporating in national law EU directives on corporate governance of listed companies and by adopting recently self-regulatory provisions. This regulatory framework contributes essentially to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholder protection and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, two pillars should be illustrated as regards board of directors in listed companies: Greek company law provides traditionally for the establishment of the general duties of loyalty and care of all board members in companies limited by shares, which are furthermore reinforced by the provisions of the Hellenic Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. Secondly, hard law rules introduce the participation of non-executive and non-executive independent directors as a legal mechanism of confronting agency problems in listed companies. These provisions have been strongly argued as regards the exact content of the obligations of all board members of listed companies to promote the corporate interest and especially as regards the monitoring role of non-executive directors. These conceptions should be followed by empirical researches in order to address a completely legal and functional approach.
Subject
Business and International Management
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