Abstract
Banking firms face an industry specific set of agency problems. The heavily regulated nature of the industry alters the shareholder/manger relationship. The scope of market discipline in the industry is severely limited due to regulatory oversight. This article surveys the state of the corporate governance literature with an emphasis on reviewing the agency problems unique to the banking industry.
Subject
General Business, Management and Accounting
Reference56 articles.
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