Revisiting the Debates on the 2010 Constitutional Referendum in Turkey: Democratic Transition or Authoritarian Populism?

Abstract

This article revisits the scholarly debates on the AKP’s constitutional amendment package that was put to vote in the 2010 Constitutional Referendum. It takes the democratic theorist Andrew Arato and constitutional scholar Aslı Bali as major representatives of the two opposing views on the political implications of the reform proposal. It compares and contrasts their arguments particularly in light of their different assessments of the amendments which concern the restructuring of the judiciary, especially the Turkish Constitutional Court. It argues that their fundamental controversy with regard to the democratic or authoritarian nature of these amendments is rooted in the contrast between Bali’s predominantly contextual and Arato’s predominantly global approach. While Bali affirms the reform proposal as a democratic step forward in transcending the persistent legacy of the Kemalist authoritarian “tutelary” regime represented by the Constitutional Court, Arato interprets it as a manifestation of the global populist-authoritarian retreat that is expresses itself most visibly through assaults against the independent judiciary. After a critical reading of these two approaches, this paper finalizes by way of introducing a new framework that would counterbalance the contextual with the global and vice versa that would arguably provide a new perspective through which one could unveil the particular characteristics of the AKP’s populist constitutional politics at the time of the Referendum.