Abstract
The brief essay is devoted to the articulation of the main claims of strong disjunctivism in its comparison with weak disjunctivism. They are examined in the main part of the essay as constituting the only possible way to defend a realist conception of truth that combines internalism with the thesis of the independence of truth from introspective justification. It is concluded that weak disjunctivism, even though it compares favorably with its opponents in this respect, cannot claim to defend a realist conception of truth.
Publisher
Vox. Philosophical Journal
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