Abstract
To accomplish IMO's emissions reduction targets, the Chinese government has established emission control areas and implemented strict sulfur limitation policies. Faced with the downturn in the shipping industry and the challenge of insufficient supply of compliant fuel, Hong Kong and Shenzhen in China have implemented different low-sulfur fuel subsidy policies. Therefore, it is particularly important to study the air pollution control mechanism considering low sulfur fuel subsidy policy. Firstly, the non-cooperative game models considering low-sulfur fuel subsidies are constructed. Secondly, the mechanisms of various factors affecting port pricing, throughput and profit are analyzed. Then, a case study is conducted by using AIS data of container ships in Shanghai Port and Ningbo Zhoushan Port. The study reveals that whether the container service price of the leader port increases or decreases, the follower port always take corresponding follow-up measures. In both sequential and simultaneous game, the profit difference of the leader port is positively related to the subsidy ratio of the port’s own and negatively related to the coefficient of the competitor's subsidy. In conclusion, the low-sulfur fuel subsidy policy has a significant positive impact on the step-by-step implementation of more stringent pollution reduction policies in port waters.
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