Abstract
The notions ofk-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models,k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).
Publisher
Fuji Technology Press Ltd.
Subject
Artificial Intelligence,Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,Human-Computer Interaction
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