Abstract
AbstractThis paper is concerned with a non-zero sum mixed differential game problem described by a backward stochastic differential equation. Here the term “mixed” means that this game problem contains a deterministic control $v_{1}$v1 of Player 1 and a random control process $v_{2}$v2 of Player 2. By virtue of the classical variational method, a necessary condition and an Arrow’s sufficient condition for the mixed stochastic differential game problem are presented. A linear–quadratic mixed differential game problem is discussed, and the corresponding Nash equilibrium point is explicitly expressed by the solution of mean-field forward–backward stochastic differential equation. The most distinguishing feature, compared with the existing literature, is that the optimal state process of the linear–quadratic game satisfies a linear mean-field backward stochastic differential equation. Finally, a home mortgage and wealth management problem is given to illustrate our theoretical results.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
the Young Chang Jiang Scholars Program of Chinese Education Ministry
the Cultivation Program of Distinguished Young Scholars of Shandong University
National Natural Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars of China
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Applied Mathematics,Algebra and Number Theory,Analysis
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