Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour

Abstract

AbstractVehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour.