Author:
Zwölfer Raphael,Lenk Anke
Abstract
Abstract
The growing presence of activist investors in Germany challenges companies with a confrontational style and broad demands. This article analyses the Anglo-American capital market phenomenon in the context of companies’ corporate governance and their shareholder structure. We examine the valuation effects of activist campaigns using share price reactions. The short-term announcement returns surrounding activist campaigns are positive and statistically significant. The mean abnormal share price return amounts to 3.96%. The results can be attributed to a combination of transaction and information effects.
Subject
Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
Reference13 articles.
1. Bebchuk, L., A. Brav und W. Jiang (2015), The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, Columbia Law Review, 05(115), 1085-1155.
2. Bessler, W. und M. Vendrasco (2022), Corporate control and shareholder activism in Germany: An empirical analysis of hedge fund strategies, International Review of Financial Analysis, 83.
3. Bluebell Capital Partners (2023), Bayer: the seeds of success. A roadmap to long term value creation, https://www.bluebellcp.com/_files/ugd/affdc3_fe925806b25d4c5cbf7b483bb1d8eddd.pdf (7. September 2023).
4. Brav, A., W. Jiang und R. Li (2021), Governance by Persuasion: Hedge Fund Activism and Market-based Shareholder Influence, ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper, 797.
5. Drerup, T. (2014), Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism in Germany, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1718365 (23. August 2023).