Affiliation:
1. George Washington University
Abstract
Abstract
I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.
Cited by
6 articles.
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1. Norms of Inquiry;Philosophy Compass;2023-10-06
2. Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?;Philosophical Studies;2023-08-04
3. Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire;The Philosophical Quarterly;2023-06-15
4. THE AIM OF INQUIRY?;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research;2023-05-21
5. Questioning and addressee knowledge;Synthese;2023-03-20