Affiliation:
1. Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) Delhi , India
2. IIIT Delhi , India
Abstract
Abstract
Anonymous VoIP calls over the Internet holds great significance for privacy-conscious users, whistle-blowers and political activists alike. Prior research deems popular anonymization systems like Tor unsuitable for providing the requisite performance guarantees that real-time applications like VoIP need. Their claims are backed by studies that may no longer be valid due to constant advancements in Tor. Moreover, we believe that these studies lacked the requisite diversity and comprehensiveness. Thus, conclusions from these studies, led them to propose novel and tailored solutions. However, no such system is available for immediate use. Additionally, operating such new systems would incur significant costs for recruiting users and volunteered relays, to provide the necessary anonymity guarantees.
It thus becomes an imperative that the exact performance of VoIP over Tor be quantified and analyzed, so that the potential performance bottlenecks can be amended. We thus conducted an extensive empirical study across various in-lab and real world scenarios to shed light on VoIP performance over Tor. In over half a million calls spanning 12 months, across seven countries and covering about 6650 Tor relays, we observed that Tor supports good voice quality (Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) >3 and one-way delay <400 ms) in more than 85% of cases. Further analysis indicates that in general for most Tor relays, the contentions due to cross-traffic were low enough to support VoIP calls, that are anyways transmitted at low rates (<120 Kbps). Our findings are supported by concordant measurements using iperf that show more than the adequate available bandwidth for most cases. Hence, unlike prior efforts, our research reveals that Tor is suitable for supporting anonymous VoIP calls.
Reference53 articles.
1. [1] Tor bridges - bridgedb. https://bridges.torproject.org/.
2. [2] Tor metrics. https://metrics.torproject.org/.
3. [3] Users guide for PRISM Skype collection, August 2012. https://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35530.pdf.
4. [4] NSA uses powerful toolbox in effort to spy on global networks, December 2013. https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/\the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-ineffort-to-spy-on-global-networks-\a-940969.html.
5. [5] Cangialosi, F., Levin, D., and Spring, N. Ting: Measuring and exploiting latencies between all tor nodes. In Proceedings of the 2015 Internet Measurement Conference (2015), ACM, pp. 289–302.
Cited by
4 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Dynamic Security Aspects of Onion Routing;Cryptography and Coding;2023-12-04
2. Evaluating Statistical Disclosure Attacks and Countermeasures for Anonymous Voice Calls;Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security;2023-08-29
3. Mass surveillance of VoIP calls in the data plane;Proceedings of the Symposium on SDN Research;2022-10-19
4. Optimizing Packet Scheduling and Path Selection for Anonymous Voice Calls;The 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security;2021-08-17