Corporate Utilization of Bank Credit Financing Advantages under Supply Chain Finance and Industrial Policy Paths

Abstract

Abstract Bank credit financing is an effective method to promote the development of enterprises, and this paper discusses the use of enterprises in the credit financing advantage supported by supply chain financial networks and industrial policy in the new era. In the paper, the strategic choice of enterprises using bank credit financing is analyzed, the Nash equilibrium point of the bank and the enterprise is modeled by calculus, and the game evolution model of enterprise use of credit financing advantage is constructed to explore the equilibrium distribution of bank credit financing. On this basis, the regression model of bank credit financing and enterprise reputation is established, and it is combined with relevant data for empirical analysis. The results show that under the initial conditions, there are two evolutionary stable strategies of (0,0,0) and (1,1,1) in the enterprise bank credit financing game system, which verifies the analysis for the stability of equilibrium point under the dual mechanism of supply chain finance and industrial policy. The regression coefficient of bank credit financing of enterprises with greater corporate reputation is 1.26, and when the explanatory variable is the indicator of short-term lending and long-term investment, the coefficient of long-term borrowing ratio is -0.003, with a significance level of 1%, and the increase of long-term borrowing ratio can significantly reduce the behavior of short-term lending and long-term investment of enterprises.