Affiliation:
1. Faculty of Law, Economics and Social sciences , University Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah , Morocco
Abstract
Abstract
The independence of Central Banks is still considered to be a credibility factor in ensuring price stability. Thus, many central banks in transition countries have undergone a change in their statutes in order to achieve greater independence from governments. In this vein, within a decade, North African Central Banks have put in place a new institutional framework for their monetary policy. In this article, we will attempt to assess and measure the legal (de jure) and real (de facto) independence of these Central Banks (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt).
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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