Affiliation:
1. University of Manchester
Abstract
Abstract
I argue for the view that some we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person plural pronoun. To prepare the ground for this argument I defend an account of the semantics of ‘we’ and note the variety of different uses of that term. I go on to defend the IEM of a certain range of we-thoughts against a number of objections.
Reference39 articles.
1. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1975. The first person. In Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, edited by Samuel D. Guttenplan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2. Blomberg, Olle. 2018. Practical knowledge and acting together. In Socially Extended Epistemology, edited by J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, O. Palermos and D. Pritchard. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Bratman, Michael E. 2014. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Braun, David. 2008. Complex demonstratives and their singular contents. Linguistics and Philosophy 31: 57–99.
5. Campbell, John. 1997. Sense, reference and selective attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 71: 55–74.10.1111/1467-8349.00019
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献