Affiliation:
1. Université du Québec à Montréal , Québec , Canada
Abstract
Abstract
This paper focuses on Carl Stumpf’s evaluation of Husserl’s phenomenology in his Logical Investigations and in the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf’s reception of the phenomenology of the Logical Investigations. I then turn to §§ 85-86 of Ideas, in which Husserl seeks to distinguish his “pure” phenomenology from Stumpf’s phenomenology. In the third part, I examine Stumpf’s critique of the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in his Ideas in §13 of Erkenntnislehre, and, in the fourth part, I examine the Spinozist interpretation of noetic-noematic correlations in Stumpf’s two studies of Spinoza. I conclude by asking whether the version of phenomenology that Husserl elaborates on during the Freiburg period does not anticipate, to some extent, Stumpf’s criticisms while confirming the latter’s diagnosis of the phenomenology of Ideas.
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