Automatic generation of sources lemmas in Tamarin: Towards automatic proofs of security protocols1
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Published:2022-08-25
Issue:4
Volume:30
Page:573-598
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ISSN:1875-8924
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Container-title:Journal of Computer Security
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language:
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Short-container-title:JCS
Author:
Cortier Véronique1, Delaune Stéphanie2, Dreier Jannik1, Klein Elise1
Affiliation:
1. Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, LORIA, F-54000 Nancy, France 2. Université Rennes, CNRS, IRISA, France
Abstract
Tamarin is a popular tool dedicated to the formal analysis of security protocols. One major strength of the tool is that it offers an interactive mode, allowing to go beyond what push-button tools can typically handle. Tamarin is for example able to verify complex protocols such as TLS, 5G, or RFID protocols. However, one of its drawback is its lack of automation. For many simple protocols, the user often needs to help Tamarin by writing specific lemmas, called “sources lemmas”, which requires some knowledge of the internal behaviour of the tool. In this paper, we propose a technique to automatically generate sources lemmas in Tamarin. Following the intuition of manually written sources lemmas, our lemmas try to keep track of the origin of a term by looking into emitted messages or facts. We prove formally that our lemmas indeed hold, for arbitrary protocols that make use of cryptographic primitives that can be modelled with a subterm convergent equational theory (modulo associativity and commutativity). We have implemented our approach within Tamarin. Our experiments show that, in most examples of the literature, we are now able to generate suitable sources lemmas automatically, in replacement of the hand-written lemmas. As a direct application, many simple protocols can now be analysed fully automatically, while they previously required user interaction.
Subject
Computer Networks and Communications,Hardware and Architecture,Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality,Software
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