Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

Published:2021-06-10 Issue: Volume: Page:1-14
ISSN:1946-2174
Container-title:Argument & Computation
language:
Short-container-title:AAC

Author:

Yun Bruno¹,Vesic Srdjan²,Oren Nir¹

Affiliation:

1. Department of Computing Science, University of Aberdeen, Scotland. E-mails: bruno.yun@abdn.ac.uk, n.oren@abdn.ac.uk

2. CNRS, Univ. Artois, CRIL, France. E-mail: vesic@cril.fr

Abstract

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

Publisher

IOS Press

Subject

Artificial Intelligence,Computational Mathematics,Computer Science Applications,Linguistics and Language

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