Developing Glasgow Accord for COP-26 Using Game Theory

Abstract

The UNFCCC hosted its 25th convention, known as COP25, which cannot be considered to be a success among the climate change conferences due to the failure of 175 nations to agree upon the final details of the Paris Agreement proposed in 2015. The aim was to bring together nations across the globe and reduce the global temperature rise to 2°C, which was expected to be around 4.5°C to 6°C. The justifications for the incompetence can be attributed to a variety of aspects, including their inability to implement the intended nationally determined contributions (INDC). Since there is no overall governing body that can ensure strong implementation of the accords, the system needs to be self-regulatory without any vulnerability to international politics. This study develops a series of factors that can be considered for decision making, benefiting and rewarding to assure complete self-governance of these nations on the said climate accord, without making it vulnerable to the political relations among nations. This study uses pre-defined elements of Game Theory in order to achieve the required equilibrium, as a base for understanding decision making and proposing a possible system to create an acceptable result for the member nations.