Affiliation:
1. The University of Queensland
Abstract
We know that sometimes when people make an offer they do not really expect us to take it up. It is generally assumed that these kinds of ostensible offers are a means of showing respect or consideration towards the feelings of others, without creating the trouble or imposition that actually acting upon that offer might entail for all the parties concerned. Yet despite the complex questions ostensible offers and other kinds of ostensible actions raise for theories of politeness, (in)sincerity and hypocrisy have received only passing attention in (im)politeness research. In this chapter, I reflect on the relationship between (in)sincerity, hypocrisy and politeness in the context of ostensible offers. I consider how participants recognise ostensible offers, what kinds of off-record purposes are accomplished when offers are treated as ostensible (rather than genuine), and why they are interpretable as polite rather than hypocritical. Drawing on an analysis of instances of ostensible and genuine offers identified in initial interactions in English between previously unacquainted interactants, I suggest that what lies at the heart of politeness in the case of ostensible offers is sincere hypocrisy. That is, while the speaker making the offer may not expect the recipient to (genuinely) accept that offer, they do nevertheless expect the recipient will recognise the purpose of making that offer is not to be disingenuous, but rather to show consideration for the feelings of the recipient. I conclude by suggesting that sincere hypocrisy is not limited to ostensible offers, but is arguably a pervasive characteristic of much of what passes as politeness more generally.
Publisher
John Benjamins Publishing Company