The nature of domains and the relationships between them in metaphorization

Abstract

In 2011 I proposed a new approach to metaphor analysis and typology, based on the strict distinction between the material and phenomenological worlds. I concluded that the ultimate source domain (experiential basis) is the world of physical objects. The present paper develops these ideas, presenting a more detailed analysis of each of the metaphor types. Thus, I claim that the concrete-to-concrete metaphors are based on metonymy and abstract-to-concrete on the OBJECT schema. Abstract-to-abstract metaphorization falls into two traditional types: structural and orientational metaphors. As to the former, I show that the vague expressions “more concrete domain” or “more abstract domain” can be made clearer by considering the ontological status of the component elements of the domain: the “more concrete” domain has more elements of physical ontology. Orientational metaphors have been found to be only superficially orientational, their true objective being valuation. I conclude that all these metaphor types eventually refer to the world of physical objects for their experiential basis.