Abstract
Background. The relevance of this study lies in the need to elucidate the effects of price discrimination and its impact on competition and social welfare. The research objective is to systematize economic tools for assessing price discrimination, particularly in the context of providing discounts. The object of the research is price discrimination, specifically in the context of rebates, widely used by companies across different markets. The research subject encompasses economic tools for assessing pro competitive and anti-competitive effects of price discrimination in the form of discounts. Methods. To achieve the stated objective, both general scientific and specialized research methods were employed. These included the analysis of contemporary literature on competition law and economics, as well as decisions made by competition authorities and courts. The method of analysis and synthesis was used to summarize and classify the instruments. Results. The study identified various economic instruments for assessing the effects of price discrimination, including the price-cost test, the equally efficient competitor test, the pull effect test, the new entrant burden test, the voluntary loss of profits test, and others. Conclusions. The combined application of these tools allows to distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive behavior of companies. It is imperative to select these tools with respect to the specific case and jurisdiction to avoid imposing excessive restrictions on loyalty programs. The growing importance of the digital economy and Ukraine's future membership in the European Union make this research relevant and crucial for the development of competition policy.
Publisher
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
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