Winner-loser effects improve social network efficiency between competitors with equal resource holding power

Abstract

AbstractAnimal societies are structured of dominance hierarchy (DH). DH can be viewed as networks and analyzed by graph theory. We study the impact of state-dependent feedback (winner-loser effect) on the emergence of local dominance structures after pairwise contests between initially equal-ranking members (equal resource-holding-power, RHP) of small and large social groups. We simulated pairwise agonistic contests between individuals with and without a priori higher RHP by Monte-Carlo-method. Random pairwise contests between equal-ranking competitors result in random dominance structures (‘Null variant’) that are low in transitive triads and high in pass along triads; whereas state-dependent feedback (‘Winner-loser variant’) yields centralized ‘star’ structured DH that evolve from competitors with initially equal RHP and correspond to hierarchies that evolve from keystone individuals. Monte-Carlo simulated DH following state-dependent feedback show motif patterns very similar to those of a variety of natural DH, suggesting that state-dependent feedback plays a pivotal role in robust self-organizing phenomena that transcend the specifics of the individual. Self-organization based on state-dependent feedback leads to social structures that correspond to those resulting from pre-existing keystone individuals. As the efficiency of centralized social networks benefits both, the individual and the group, centralization of social networks appears to be an important evolutionary goal.