The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Author:

Krams Indrikis12,Kokko Hanna3,Vrublevska Jolanta2,Āboliņš-Ābols Mikus4,Krama Tatjana2,Rantala Markus J.5

Affiliation:

1. Institute of Ecology and Earth Sciences, University of Tartu, 51014 Tartu, Estonia

2. Institute of Systematic Biology, University of Daugavpils, Daugavpils 5401, Latvia

3. Department of Ecology, Evolution and Genetics, Research School of Biology, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200, Australia

4. Department of Biology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA

5. Department of Biology, University of Turku, 20024 Turku, Finland

Abstract

Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time. It creates the obvious dilemma in which there is always a short-term benefit to cheating, therefore cooperating individuals must avoid being exploited by non-cooperating cheaters. This is achieved by following various decision rules, usually variants of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The strength of TFT, however, is also its weakness—mistakes in implementation or interpretation of moves, or the inability to cooperate, lead to a permanent breakdown in cooperation. We show that pied flycatchers ( Ficedula hypoleuca ) use a TFT with an embedded ‘excuse principle’ to forgive the neighbours that were perceived as unable to cooperate during mobbing of predators. The excuse principle dramatically increases the stability of TFT-like behavioural strategies within the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

Publisher

The Royal Society

Subject

General Agricultural and Biological Sciences,General Environmental Science,General Immunology and Microbiology,General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology,General Medicine

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