Risk tolerance and control perception in a game-theoretic bioeconomic model for small-scale fisheries

Abstract

Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social parameters that might favour cooperation. We assessed the degrees to which risk tolerance and control perception affect the cooperative behaviours of fishers in a restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF) in southern Brazil. We also assessed the likelihood of a scenario wherein a cooperative strategy can evolve and dominate the system. We identified dominance and coexistence outcomes for the RSSF. Sensitivity analyses suggested that both control perception and risk tolerance could facilitate a cooperative outcome for the fishery.