Sympathetic Organizations: body, mind, and society in Robert Whytt and David Hume

Abstract

This paper argues that Robert Whytt's concepts of ‘particular’ and ‘general sympathy’ in animate bodies are homologous with a less-discussed concept of sympathy in David Hume. There are at least three different concepts of sympathy in Hume's Treatise of human nature.  Hume is rather critical of alleged sympathies between different bodies, but he elaborates a much-discussed theory of sympathy explaining the interpersonal exchange of sentiments. He invokes a third concept to designate the phenomenon of mutual responsiveness between, and coordination for a common end among, the parts of the mind while suggesting that the mind's unity and identity is of the same kind as the unity of organized living bodies. Without deploying this concept explicitly, he speaks a remarkably identical language while discussing social coordination and convention. This third concept is congruent with the physiological sympathies that Whytt finds in animate bodies. According to the unfolding picture, Whytt and Hume provide conceptually highly integrated accounts of living bodies, minds, and societies inspired by an idea of vital matter.