Affiliation:
1. Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology , Dhaka 1000, Bangladesh
Abstract
A novel approach rooted in co-evolutionary game theory has been introduced to investigate how the interaction between human decision-making and the dynamics of the epidemic environment can shape vaccine acceptance during disease outbreaks. This innovative framework combines two key game concepts: the cooperation–defection game and the cost–benefit vaccination game. By doing so, it enables us to delve into the various factors that influence the success of a vaccination campaign amid an outbreak. Within this framework, individuals engage in a thorough evaluation of the risks, benefits and incentives associated with either cooperating by getting vaccinated or defecting by refusing the vaccine. Additionally, it involves a careful analysis of the costs and benefits linked to vaccine acceptance. The outcomes of this study stress the importance of two main factors: the effectiveness of the vaccine and the prevalence of a cooperative culture within society. This insight into the strategic interactions between individuals and their decisions about vaccination holds significant implications for public health policymakers. It equips to boost vaccination coverage and address vaccine hesitancy within society ultimately contributing to better public health outcomes during epidemic outbreaks.