Affiliation:
1. Department of Mathematics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RF, UK
2. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate evolutionary games with the invasion process updating rules on three simple non-directed graphs: the star, the circle and the complete graph. Here, we present an analytical approach and derive the exact solutions of the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. We present formulae for the fixation probability and also for the speed of the evolutionary process, namely for the mean time to absorption (either mutant fixation or extinction) and then the mean time to mutant fixation. Through numerical examples, we compare the different impact of the population size and the fitness of each type of individual on the above quantities on the three different structures. We do this comparison in two specific cases. Firstly, we consider the case where mutants have fixed fitness
r
and resident individuals have fitness 1. Then, we consider the case where the fitness is not constant but depends on games played among the individuals, and we introduce a ‘hawk–dove’ game as an example.
Subject
General Physics and Astronomy,General Engineering,General Mathematics
Cited by
62 articles.
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