A no-individuals account of quantum mechanics

Abstract

One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.