Affiliation:
1. School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo 108-0023, Japan
Abstract
Evolution of cooperation is a puzzle in evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous studies assumed that players are equal and have symmetric relationships. In our society, players are in different roles, have an asymmetric relationship and cooperate together. We focused on the linear division of labour in a unidirectional chain that has finite roles, each of which is assigned to one group with cooperators and defectors. A cooperator in an upstream group produces and modifies a product, paying a cost of cooperation, and hands it to a player in a downstream group who obtains the benefit from the product. If players in all roles cooperate, a final product can be completed. However, if a player in a group chooses defection, the division of labour stops, the final product cannot be completed and all players in all roles suffer damage. By using the replicator equations of the asymmetric game, we investigate which sanction system promotes the evolution of cooperation in the division of labour. We find that not the benefit of the product but the cost of cooperation matters to the evolutionary dynamics and that the probability of finding a defector determines which sanction system promotes the evolution of cooperation.
Funder
JST, the establishment of university fellowships towards the creation of science technology innovation
JSPS KAKENHI
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