Author:
Bagaric Mirko,Pathinayake Athula
Abstract
Parity in sentencing is the principle that offenders who are parties to a crime should, all things being equal, receive the same penalty. While it is a well-established principle, the reality is that its scope is greatly limited by the largely unfettered nature of the sentencing calculus. Things are rarely equal between offenders due to the large number of variables that current orthodoxy maintains are relevant to sentencing. This makes application of the parity principle unpredictable, resulting in the paradox that parity highlights the unfairness that it is meant to mitigate: inconsistency in sentencing. This article contends that parity will remain an aspiration, as opposed to a concrete principle, until the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing yields to a more transparent and precise decision-making process. The article focuses on Australian jurisprudence, but the analysis applies to all jurisdictions where sentencing has a considerable discretionary component (including the UK and the USA—apart from the limited circumstances where mandatory sentences apply).
Cited by
2 articles.
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