1. R. Allen and P. Roberts (eds),Special Issue on the Reference Class Problem-317.
2. See L. J. Cohen,The Probable and the Provable(Clarendon Press: Oxford 1977) 74. The type of legal proceedings (criminal or civil) and the precise heading of the claim are intentionally left vague in my variation.
3. It could be argued that, if the case is in the criminal context, then the fact that Alice is mistaken in one-tenth of her identifications is sufficient to establish a reasonable doubt. Even if this is true, this objection may be bypassed by adjusting the example to accommodate one's desired threshold of reliability (e.g. Alice is mistaken only once in 100 or 1,000 times).
4. D. T. Wasserman, `The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken Liability' (1992) 13Cardozo Law Review935. An earlier account which also puts individuality in the centre is Zuckerman's account of individualised justice, see A. A. S. Zuckerman, `Law, Fact or Justice?' (1986) 66Boston University Law Review487. Although Zuckerman's account includes important procedural dimensions which are missing from Wasserman's account, Wasserman's treatment of individuality is more developed and thus this article focuses only on Wasserman's account.
5. Wasserman, above n. 4 at 942-3 (emphasis added).