Abstract
Even though conscious experiences are explored in contemporary psychology with different methodological approaches significant questions remain: Can we explore first-person experiences with reliable methods? Why and in which circumstances should we trust first person reports? And how can we ensure that the process of verbalising mental experiences is not only a construction process but a methodological transformation, which enables intersubjective access to them. It is the aim of this paper to analyse how micro-phenomenology, understood as a simultaneously phenomenological and also empirical applied research method, tries to answer the questions and challenges mentioned above. To accomplish this, I focus in the first section on how firstand second-person access to conscious experiences is ensured and justified within the micro-phenomenological interview research procedure. In the second section, I concentrate on the question of whether micro-phenomenology has access to phenomenal experiences themselves given that they are mediated by interviews and complex processes of categorization and evaluation. In the final step, I analyse whether the explanatory scope of micro-phenomenology can be enhanced by integrating mixed method approaches to study mental phenomena qualitatively and quantitatively.
Publisher
Psychosozial-Verlag GmbH and Co. KG
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