South Sudan: Consequences of the secession

Abstract

In July 2011, South Sudan separated from the Republic of Sudan (RoS), and a new state appeared on the world map - the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS). At that time, the prospects for South Sudan seemed promising: in addition to rich oil resources, the young country had serious support of the world community and an influential diaspora that provided humanitarian assistance. When proclaiming independence, South Sudan counted on a significant increase in oil revenues, but Juba could not export black gold without the use of oil pipelines laid through the North. As a result, the split and the following “oil war” cost both countries dearly, although the RoS emerged from the conflict if not a winner, then with less losses than the RoSS, which, moreover, became engulfed in internal armed and inter-factional conflicts almost immediately after gaining independence. Amid an economic downturn, South Sudan gradually plunged into the chaos of a full-scale civil war, which formally ended in September 2018, but in fact continued until February 2020. The destructive phenomena that preceded the deterioration of the political situation in the RoSS include progressing (Dinka centric) tribalism of the country's top leadership, exclusion of representatives of many smaller ethnic groups from the decision-making process, and the refusal to reform the army and normalize the civil-military relations. The quality of governance by public administration in the RoSS is not just very low, but is gradually declining. South Sudan not only did not become “democratic” as was intended, but actually regressed towards a repressive state that plunged the population into extreme poverty. Although the secession was the solution to the conflict between the North and the South, it led to an escalation of violence and the emergence of new problems, which are no less serious than those it was designed to solve.