Abstract
AbstractWe consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using theirtheory of circular definitionsas those notions universally definable overthe next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account ofvaried revision sequences—as ageneralised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
15 articles.
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1. Guest Editors’ Introduction;Journal of Philosophical Logic;2018-08-23
2. Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth;Journal of Philosophical Logic;2018-08-07
3. How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox;Philosophical Studies;2017-05-20
4. Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension;Journal of Philosophical Logic;2017-03-08
5. Conditionals in Theories of Truth;Journal of Philosophical Logic;2016-02-01