Charles Lennox Wyke and the Clayton-Bulwer Formula in Central America, 1852-1860

Abstract

People here don't care two straws about Central America, or Mosquitia or the Bay Islands or the Honduras boundary,” complained British Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon to Prime Minister Lord Palmerston in December 1857, “all they wish for is freedom of interoceanic communication and this they believe can be achieved without a quarrel with the U.S.” Clarendon's bitter remark reflected his government's enduring frustration in arranging British holdings in Central America in accord with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. That diplomatic landmark was to have commenced an unprecedented era of Anglo-American cooperation in Central America that would finally fulfill the ancient dream of rapid interoceanic transit through the isthmus. The treaty prohibited colonization or fortification of Central America by either side and provided Anglo-American protection for a U.S. company's canalbuilding venture in Nicaragua. But the unfortunate document had yet to bring about the desired ends. No canal had materialized and the “Central American Question” would not go away. In vain the British government had tried to extricate itself from its embarassingly forward position in Central America. In the meantime, a wave of U.S. filibusters, urged on by the bold words and permissive attitude of their government, threatened to trample underfoot the treaty's prohibitions against foreign colonization. By the end of 1857, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was in imminent danger of U.S. abrogation, and Palmerston and his cabinet had nearly despaired of ever exiting the isthmian quagmire with British honor intact, without at the same time opening the gates for the “most disageeable” Yankees.