The generals in The Hellespont, 410–407 B.C.

Abstract

The course of Athenian military operations after the battle of Kyzikos is not to be explained by considerations of strategy alone. Immediately after their victory the Athenian commanders acted briskly enough, building a fort and instituting a tithe at Chrysopolis, but instead of following up the annihilation of Mindaros' fleet by the capture of Sparta's bases on land, they then lapsed into an inactivity hard to excuse in generals who had just shown such capacity in action, and apparently alien to the temperament of Alkibiades. The whole history of Greek naval warfare shows that no power can maintain control of the sea while the nearby seaboard remains in the hands of the enemy, and by thus neglecting the coastal towns Athens allowed Sparta bases in the Hellespont for the ships which Pasippidas and Klearchos collected from the allies (Xen. Hell. I 1. 32, 36, 3. 17) and even opportunity for new construction (ibid. 1. 25–6, 3. 17). The Hellespont was in any case vital to Athens, the area in which a defeat could lose the whole war for her, yet though Thrasyllos had gone home months before the battle to get reinforcements for the Hellespont, nothing was sent there, and when Thrasyllos did collect a force he took it to Ionia.