Habit, Emotion, and Self-Conscious Action

Abstract

Modern sociological theory tends to be overly cognitive, underemphasizing both habit and emotions. During the past decade, the increased attention to the sociology of emotions has helped partially to correct for some of the problems created by overly cognitive theories. More recent attention is focusing on habitual activities. Although several classic theorists dealt with habit, the concept was dropped from modern sociological theories, beginning some seventy years ago. The present article extends the research on the removal of the concept of habit from sociological theory by evaluating the treatment of habit by George Herbert Mead and symbolic interactionists. Although Mead's theory integrated habit with cognitive and emotional processes, most symbolic interactionists have taken an overly cognitive position that neglects habit. The sharp contrast between the two positions adds to the documentation that sociology has drifted toward highly cognitive theories in the past half century. Mead's theory shows that it is not necessary for sociology to neglect habit or emotion and that it is possible to integrate habit, emotions, and self-conscious action in one internally consistent theory.