Abstract
Abstract
This paper argues against a kind of “overall ought.” The main argument is a version of the paradox of supererogation. The problem is this: obligating an agent to do what’s overall best will, when that differs from what’s they morally ought to do, obligate the agent to not do what’s they morally ought to. This, the paper will argue, is implausible. For each of four possible interpretations of this overall ought concept, it will either come across a form of this paradox or no longer look like the targeted “overall ought” concept at all.
Publisher
University of Illinois Press
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